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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION 
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals overlooked or misapprehended points of fact which were 
important to the analysis of reasonable suspicion and points of 
law in that it incorrectly applied the standard of review for 
assessing the facts before the trial court and in that it 
misapplied the reasonable suspicion standard. 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests, therefore, under Rule 
3 5 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, that the Court 
reconsider its decision reversing the trial and court, and in 
that this case has not previously been argued orally, the 
Plaintiff requests further that it be scheduled for oral 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEAL INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE STANDARD FOR 
REVIEW OF THE FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
A. THE FACTS ARE CLEAR FROM THE TRIAL COURT RECORD. 
The facts relevant to this petition consist of the testimony 
of Sandy police officer Pingree who cited the defendant for DUI. 
A copy of the eleven page transcript of Officer Pingreefs 
testimony is included as Appendix ,fB" to Plaintiff's appeal 
brief. Such facts show as follows: 
1. On Sunday, August 6, 1988, at approximately 1:30 a.m., 
defendant's car approached the intersection of 9400 South and 
State Street. Trans. 5. When first observed, the car was 
eastbound on 94 00 South — a four lane highway with two eastbound 
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lanes. Trans. 7-8. 
2. Officer Pingree's police car was facing east in the 
outside eastbound lane of 9400 South. He was stopped just east 
of the intersection. The officer was standing next to a car 
parked directly in front of his own. The overhead lights on the 
police car were flashing. There was apparently no visible sign 
as to whether Officer Pingree had stopped to issue a citation or 
for some other purpose. In fact, the officer was helping a 
motorist start her car. Trans. 7. 
3. The defendant pulled next to the officer's car in the 
center of the inside lane. There were no cars stopped ahead of 
the defendant and the officer did not direct the stop. He parked 
there for about 30 seconds. During that time, the officer, 
waived the defendant forward. The defendant eventually began to 
move eastbound at a "very slow speed." Trans. 7-9. 
4. Officer Pingree followed the defendant without overhead 
lights for about five blocks. Trans. 10. Defendant's speed was 
approximately 2 0 mph in a 40 mph zone. Trans. 9, 12. There was 
no other traffic in the area to explain this speed. Trans. 8. 
5. Officer Pingree turned on his overhead lights at about 
550 East. The patrol car was 20-30 feet behind Defendant's car 
at the time. Defendant continued east for approximately 1 1/2 
more blocks before even noticing the overhead lights. Trans. 11-
12. 
6. Defendant's vehicle eventually pulled to the right side 
of the road. Trans. 11. It then rolled forward at about one 
2 
mile per hour for about 3 0 feet before finally coming to a stop. 
Trans, 12. 
7. Officer Pingree is a veteran police officer. Trans 2-
3. He has detected and arrested hundreds of DUI suspects. 
Trans. 5. Such detection was accomplished through extensive 
training in DUI investigations. Trans. 2-3. His training 
included how to detect persons under the influence of intoxicants 
from vehicle driving patterns and other suspect characteristics. 
Trans. 4-5. 
8. Through such training and experience, Officer Pingree 
has come to understand the factors which suggest that a driver 
may be under the influence of intoxicants. Such factors include 
an unusual driving pattern such as unnecessarily slow driving or 
stopping. Trans. 4. 
9. Officer Pingree developed the opinion that defendant's 
driving pattern was unusual and unnecessary under all the 
conditions. Trans. 9. His decision to stop defendant's car was 
based on that opinion, formed through Officer Pingree's extensive 
training and experience in DUI detection. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS VIEWED THE EVIDENCE IN A MANNER 
HOSTILE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION. 
The Court of Appeals cited three basis for suspicion as 
follows: 
The officer testified that he suspected defendant 
was intoxicated because at 1:30 a.m. he drove slowly in 
the inside lane, and because he stopped alongside the 
officer's car and failed to "immediately" move on when 
signaled to do so by the officer. Memorandum Decision, 
p. 2. 
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This summary of the evidence inaccurately minimizes the 
unusual driving pattern of defendant's vehicle. In fact, there 
were six bases for suspicion. Together they formed a continuous 
pattern of suspicious driving from when the defendant was first 
observed until stopped. Officer Pingree articulated these 
objective facts as follows: 
1. Stopping without necessity in a four lane roadway, 
adjacent to an intersection, and in a manner to entirely impede 
all eastbound traffic. 
2. Standing at that location for approximately thirty 
seconds. 
3. Failing to respond to Officer Pingreefs directive to 
move on. 
4. Traveling very slowly in the inside lane for over five 
blocks. 
5. Failing to even notice Officer Pingree's overhead 
lights, immediately behind him, for approximately 11/2 more 
blocks. 
6. Rolling forward at the roadside at about one mph for 
about 3 0 feet before finally coming to a stop. 
Officer Pingree did not claim that each of the six elements 
formed a separate basis for his suspicion. He was trained to 
evaluate the whole "driving pattern." Officer Pingree accurately 
and wisely concluded that such pattern was not consistent with 
the habits and conduct of a normal driver. Neither "curiosity" 
and courtesy pose a reasonable explanation of such a 
comprehensive pattern of unusual driving behavior. 
The Appeal Court's Memorandum Decision did not address all 
these facts. Such facts as were considered were segmented in a 
manner which understated the actual testimony. For instance, 
the Court minimized the length of time the defendant remained 
stopped after being waived forward. The Court stated that "when 
waved on by Officer Pingree, defendant hesitated momentarily, 
then pulled away . . . " p. 2. Officer Pingree testified the 
defendant "eventually" moved on, suggesting more than momentary 
hesitation. Trans. 8. 
The Memorandum Decision also leaves the implication that the 
entire time the defendant stopped was momentary. It is 
undisputed that the defendant was stopped for thirty seconds. To 
a police officer waiting for someone to move on, "that's a real 
long time." Trans. 9. 
The Court of Appeals must view the evidence "in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 2. By segmenting and understating the 
elements of defendant's driving pattern, the Court of Appeals 
created a fictional characterization of events hostile to the 
trial court's determination and contrary to the standard for its 
review. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION STANDARD TO THE FACTS AND INFERENCES BEFORE IT. 
To justify an investigative stop, an officer must "point to 
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
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inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude that [the defendant] had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." State v. Truiillo, 739 P. 2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 
1987). This test has three parts: 1) articulable facts, 2) 
rational inferences drawn from the facts, and 3) a conclusion, 
based the standard of a reasonable person, that a crime has or 
will be committed. 
In addition to the three part test, courts have pointed to 
other factors which must be considered in determining reasonable 
suspicion for a stop. A court must take into account the 
training of the officer. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 
(Utah App. 1988). A court must look at the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah 
App. 1988). The level of suspicion required to justify an 
investigative stop is substantially less demanding than that 
required for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 57 
U.S.L.W. 4401, 4403 (U.S. 1989). 
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of 
Appeal's decision misapprehended several key factors in its 
analysis of the investigative stop. In summary, the decision 
overlooks or minimizes facts appropriately articulated as a basis 
for the stop—facts which were both specific and objective. The 
decision readily draws inferences of innocent behavior from the 
facts but overlooks logical inferences of impairment. The 
decision views the facts in isolation without regard to the 
unlikelihood of the total sequence of events. The decision does 
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not appear to take into account Officer Pingree's extensive 
training and experience in DUI investigation. And the decision 
applies a level of suspicion which appears to be more akin to 
that required for probable cause than that traditionally required 
for investigative stops. This decision will significantly deter 
the efforts of law enforcers to protect the public from 
intoxicated drivers. 
Slow driving and stopping without cause are classic signs of 
driving under the influence. This is standard training for law 
enforcers. The Drinking Driver, cited in Plaintiff's brief, is a 
guide for Utah law enforcers in detecting and apprehending people 
driving under the influence. It states clearly that slow driving 
and stopping without cause are among the driving patterns which 
indicate DUI. 
These driving patterns are verified by national guidelines. 
The U.S. Department of Transportation has published a manual 
titled the Preliminary Breath Testing for Drinking-Driving 
Enforcement: Trainee's Manual. The manual lists 2 0 cues which 
police officers may use to detect nighttime drunk drivers. The 
list was developed from "interviews with a variety of law 
enforcement specialists in DWI detection; from a detailed 
analysis of more than 1,000 DWI arrest reports from different 
geographical regions; and from a field study in which cues 
These cues are also cited in the Standardized Field Sobriety 
Testing Student Manual, Institute of Police Technology and 
Management, University of Florida. 
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observed in more than 600 patrol stops were correlated with 
driver BAC [blood alcohol content] levels." p. 2-5. 
Two cues listed in the manual are Speed Slower Than 10 MPH 
Below Limit and Stopping Without Cause in Traffic Lanes. For 
each cue, the manual lists the chance in 100 that a driver 
displaying the pattern has a BAC of 0.10% or greater. There is a 
50% chance that a person driving 10 MPH below the speed limit has 
a BAC of 0.10% or greater. The same percentage is attached to a 
vehicle which stops without cause. Regarding Stopping Without 
Cause, the manual states: 
The critical element in this cue is that there is no 
observable justification for the vehicle to stop in the 
traffic lane; the stop is not caused by traffic 
conditions, traffic signals, an emergency situation, or 
related circumstances. Intoxicated drivers might stop 
in lane when their capability to interpret information 
and make decisions becomes severely impaired. As a 
consequence, stopping (without cause) in a traffic lane 
is likely to occur at intersections or other decision 
points. 
Id. at 2-7. 
The Court's decision suggests that there may have been a 
justification for the defendant's stop—that the defendant 
stopped out of curiosity or to render assistance. But an 
unimpaired driver would not have stopped for 3 0 seconds, 
particularly when the stop would have immediately obstructed 
traffic moving through the intersection. The unimpaired driver 
would also have moved forward immediately after the officer waved 
him on. 
These facts, rather than indicating that the defendant 
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stopped out of curiosity or to render assistance, demonstrate the 
defendant's inability to interpret information and make 
decisions. It is important to note that another cue listed in 
the manual is Slow Response to Traffic Signals. Of course, this 
cue generally refers to traffic semaphores, but it can be applied 
equally the directions of a police officer. It should also be 
noted that there is no indication in the record that the car the 
officer was assisting would have appeared disabled to a passerby. 
The record does not say, for instance, that the hood was open. 
The average driver might more likely have thought that the 
officer had made a stop for a traffic violation. 
Just as stopping without cause reflects lack of decision-
making ability, slow driving reflects lack of control. The 
Court's opinion asserts that the lack of vehicle control 
associated with DUI can be detected only by reckless or erratic 
driving. Memorandum Decision, p. 3. But an intoxicated person 
drives slowly because of his inability to perceive and process 
information at normal speeds. He is no more able to control the 
vehicle than the person who drives erratically. 
Significantly, the values attached to Slow Driving and 
Stopping Without Cause in the trainee's manual are based on the 
observation of only one cue, not on a combination of cues. p. 2-
5. Officer Pingree observed both cues, and when two or more cues 
are observed, the probability of DUI increases 10%. Icl. at 2-5. 
These cues are useful general guidelines but do not account 
for subtleties in each individual case which may further indicate 
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impairment. The Court observed that there was "nothing 
inherently untoward in a driver traveling under the speed limit 
or in stopping momentarily." Memorandum Decision, p. 2-3. But 
it is difficult to imagine how the sequence of unusual events in 
this case would not give rise to a reasonable suspicion: 1) the 
stop in the middle of the highway, for no apparent reason, 
totally blocking eastbound traffic, 2) the extended length of the 
stop, 3) the failure to react to the officer's signal to move 
forward, 4) the slow speed over an extended distance, 5) the 
failure to respond to the officer's overhead lights, even though 
it was dark and the officer was only 20-30 feet behind, 6) the 
continued slow speed, 7) the unusually slow stop once the 
defendant pulled to the side of the road. The rational inference 
that is drawn from these facts, taken individual and 
collectively, is that the defendant was exhibiting the lack of 
perception and control associated with a driver impaired by an 
intoxicant. 
A number of cases from other jurisdictions have upheld DUI 
stops under circumstances similar to those in this case. 
State v. Ratliff, 728 P.2d 896 (Or. App. 1986) involved a 
defendant driving, early in the morning, 20-25 MPH in a 55 MPH 
zone. In the vicinity of the incident where a number of private 
residences, two businesses, and some fields. The officer had 
been traveling north and had seen no traffic on the road. He 
became suspicious when, after turning around to go south, he saw 
the defendant's headlights ahead of him. The vehicle could have 
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come only from one of the businesses or residences. The vehicle 
pulled into a private drive and then pulled out again and 
traveled past the officer's position at a slow speed. The 
officer followed him for about half a mile at 20-25 MPH and then 
stopped him. 
The officer stated that his primary reason for the stop was 
suspicion of burglary. Suspicion of DUI was secondary. 
Significantly, the court based its theory for the stop wholly on 
suspicion of DUI. The officer testified that he had been trained 
in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers cind the driving 
behavior he observed conformed with two patterns which he had 
been taught may indicate DUI: driving below 10 MPH under the 
speed limit and stopping to wait for a police officer to leave 
the area. He stated further that "driving underspeed was a 
characteristic that occurred in approximately half of the DUII 
arrests in a National Traffic Safety Institute Study." Id. at 
898. The court concluded that these "two specific and 
articulable facts . . . provided a reasonable basis to suspect 
that defendant was driving while under the influence of 
intoxicants." Td. at 899. 
In Shull v. Commissioner of Public Safely, 398 N.W.2d 11 
(Minn. App. 1986) the Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld a DUI 
stop under facts more arguably innocent than those in Ratliff. 
The officer observed a vehicle which was weaving back and forth 
over the center line and which in the officers estimation was 
traveling slower than necessary given the road conditions. It 
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was undisputed, however, that the road was snow-packed and icy. 
Furthermore, the defendant testified that the road was winding 
and slippery, had no visible centerline because of the snow, and 
that he was following tracks made in the snow in the middle of 
the road. Another witness verified that he had driven at a 
similar speed and followed the same tracks. 
The court concluded: 
The officer articulated specific facts—excessively 
slow speed and weaving over the center line—to support 
the stop. The reasonable inference the officer drew 
from these facts was that Shull may have been driving 
while under the influence. The fact that another 
inference might have been drawn, that Shull was driving 
properly for the conditions, does not negate the fact 
that Alexander, a trained officer, observed objective 
facts which made him suspect Shull of criminal driving. 
Id. at 14. 
Similarly, in Graves v. State, 305 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. App. 
1983), the officer observed a vehicle traveling 30-35 MPH in a 55 
MPH zone. Reciting the facts, the court said: "The car seemed to 
be operated in a slightly erratic manner, weaving slightly within 
the lane [emphasis added]." Id. at 915. The court held that the 
officer had adequate reason to stop the car and determine whether 
the driver was under the influence of intoxicants. Id. at 916. 
In Clark v. State, 738 P.2d 772 (Alaska App. 1987), the 
officer observed a vehicle slide twelve to fifteen feet to a stop 
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on some loose gravel at an intersection. The vehicle then turned 
and proceeded at 25 MPH in a 45 MPH zone. This occurred an about 
4:30 a.m. Based on this evidence, the court said that the trial 
judge "was not clearly erroneous is finding that there was 
sufficient information for [the officer] to form a reasonable 
suspicion that [the defendant] was DWI." Id. at 774. 
Other courts have permitted stops for suspected DUI when the 
defendant's driving pattern included slow driving. State v. 
Fitzherbert, 361 A. 2d 916 (Me. 1976): The officer initially saw 
the vehicle traveling at least 20 MPH below the speed limit and 
saw a passenger throw what appeared to be a beer bottle out of 
the car. He followed the car for 2 0 minutes apparently noting no 
irregularities, except that the defendant kept glancing in this 
mirror. The vehicle made an abrupt turn without a signal and 
began to speed up. State v. Powell, 603 P. 2d 143 (Hawaii 1979): 
Vehicle traveled at unusually slow speed, stopped 10 to 15 feet 
from an intersection line, and waited 10 seconds to continue. He 
followed the same pattern at the next intersection after 
signalling about 200 feet before the stop. There was no other 
traffic in the area. 
The foregoing cases support the trial court's finding that 
the officer had a reasonable suspicion for stopping the 
defendant. Each case recognizes slow driving, combined with 
other factors, as an indicia of DUI. Also important is that many 
of the facts supporting the stop could have been explained as 
innocent behavior. In its decision, the Court of Appeals left 
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the implication that reasonable suspicion is determined by a test 
of balancing innocent behavior against culpable behavior: "these 
facts are equally indicative of innocent behavior and, without 
more, do not provide a reasonable basis to suspect defendant of 
being intoxicated [emphasis added]." p. 3. This statement could 
be misconstrued to mean that reasonable suspicion is more along 
the lines of probable cause. This, of course, is not the case. 
But it can only be assumed, given the Court's decision and the 
strength of the evidence, that the Court applied this more 
demanding standard. 
This case must be distinguished from cases such as Sierra, 
Baird, and Carpena in which there may have been an underlying 
suspicion of pretext or profiling based on mere hunches. Here 
the facts articulated by the officer were direct indicia of the 
charge for which the defendant was arrested. The officer viewed 
these facts and made his decision to effect a stop based on 
extensive training and experience. From the beginning to end the 
defendant pursued a course of conduct which was unlikely at best 
and clearly gave rise, in view of all the circumstances, to 
reasonable suspicion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the standard of 
review for the factual determinations of the trial court by not 
viewing the evidence in a manner most favorable to the trial 
court's decision. The Court overlooked or minimized facts which 
were clearly before the trial court and are essential to an 
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analysis of the basis for the investigative stop. Furthermore, 
the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the reasonable suspicion 
standard to the facts and inferences before it. The Plaintiff 
respectfully requests, therefore, that the court rehear this 
case. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
I, Clifford W. Lark, attorney of record for the Plaintiff 
and Respondent, hereby certifies to this Court that this petition 
is filed and presented in good faith and not for any purpose of 
delay. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 1989 
iffata W. Lark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September IS"**7 , 1989 I mailed 
four copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, by Certified 
Mail, to D. Bruce Oliver, Diumenti and Lindsley, 505 South Main 
Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
^^. y^^c 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpt, Preliminary Breath Testing for Drinking-Driving 
Enforcement: Traineefs Manualf U.S. Department of Transportation, 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1982). 
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® Preliminary Breath Testing 
for Drinking-Driving 
Enforcement 
Trainee's Manual 
US Department 
of Transportation 
National Highway 
Traffic Safety 
Administration 
Foreword 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is responsible for developing training 
programs responsive to the Uniform National Standards established by the Highway Safety Act of 1966. 
These programs provide guidelines for training in State and local jurisdictions having highway safety and 
traffic law enforcement responsibilities. NHTSA, therefore, intends that the programs be of the highest 
quality and that they address the high-priority training needs of agencies that provide highway safety 
services. An especially important training need arises when new technology becomes available to augment 
highway safety services. 
NHTSA sponsored the preparation of this training package in response to such a technological develop-
ment. Preliminary breath testing (PBT) devices provide a means of improving a police officer's ability to 
evaluate suspected drinking-driving violators. A reasonably accurate, reliable and easy-to-operate PBT can 
give an on-the-spot indication of the suspects blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that will be an important 
factor in the officer's decision to arrest or not to arrest. Proper use of PBTs is expected to lead to more effective 
enforcement of drinking-driving laws and, in turn, to reduction of alcohol-related crashes and fatalities. 
In recent years NHTSA and several private manufacturers have substantially advanced PBT technology. 
Several types of these devices now exist, each employing technically sound operating principles and promis-
ing reasonably accurate and reliable indications of BAC at reasonable cost. Extensive field tests of several of 
these PBT models have demonstrated a significant increase in enforcement effectiveness. Increased use of 
these devices by law enforcement agencies is anticipated. NHTSA developed this training program to provide 
the instruction and motivation necessary for the most effective use of PBT devices. 
This training course has been designated as the Preliminary Breath Testing for Drinking-Driving 
Enforcement. It is a one day course comprised of six units. 
ill 
Introduction 
This manual is your principal study guide and 
reference source for the basic course in Preliminary 
Breath Testing for Drinking-Driving Enforcement. It 
provides a detailed outline of each unit of the course. 
These outlines list the training objectives and con-
tent of each unit. The training objectives list what 
you are expected to be able to do at the end of each 
unit. The content outline contains the information 
you will need to achieve the training objectives. This 
information will be supplemented by the instructor's 
classroom discussions, sample problems and exer-
cises and hands-on practice sessions. The unit out-
lines also include study topics, which consist of sam-
ple problems and suggestions for reviewing the 
material covered. 
This manual is only a basic reference document, 
not a complete text for the course. Some of the essen-
tial information for this training comes from your 
State, your community and your law enforcement 
agency. This "local" information includes the stat-
utes and regulat ions concerning drinking-driving 
violations, policies and procedures affecting enforce-
ment and the specific role of preliminary breath test-
ing devices in enforcement. Your instructor will pre-
sent this information in lectures and handouts as 
•well as in the additional reference sources sug-
gested.1 By the end of the course, your lecture notes, 
handouts and reference citations, together with the 
content outlines of this manual, will provide you with 
a complete set of information about prearrest screen-
ing in your jurisdiction. 
This manual will be useful to you at three dif-
ferent times. First, before the course, it will allow you 
to preview the contents, structure and sequence of 
units. This should make it easier to follow the presen-
tations and discussions. Second, during the course 
the manual can serve as an excellent notebook. Its 
detailed outline should minimize the need for taking 
elaborate notes; instead, you will be able to concen-
trate on recording other key points of the instructor's 
lecture. Third, after the course is completed, the man-
ual and your notes will be a reference/refresher source. 
If your instructor conducts a formal test, your com-
pleted manual will help you prepare for the test. 
In addition, as you apply what you have learned 
in this course to your drinking-driving enforcement 
duties, you can use the manual to refresh your memo-
ry. Also, the manual can be easily updated to accom-
modate changes in statutes and policies. If new types 
of devices are adopted, information on them can be 
added to this manual. Making these changes will 
keep the manual current and useful. 
lSince the training package was prepared by NHTSA for nation-
wide use, this kind of material could not have been included in the 
basic manual. 
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Unit 2—Appendix 
Following are 20 cues which police officers may 
use to detect nighttime drunk drivers The cues were 
developed from interviews with a variety of law en-
forcement specialists in DWI detection, from a de-
tailed analysis of more than 1,000 DWI arrest reports 
from different geographical regions, and from a field 
study in which cues observed in more than 600 patrol 
stops were correlated with driver BAC levels These 
cues represent the most systematically developed 
method available for visually predicting whether a 
vehicle operated at night is being driven by a DWI 
driver or a sober driver. 
An illustrated booklet listing the cues is avail-
able free of charge from: 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Administrative Operations Division, 
Room 4423, 400 7th Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590. 
Ask for, Guide for Detecting Drunk Drivers at Night 
(DOT HS 805 711) 
Probability Values 
The number given after each visual cue is the 
probability that a driver exhibiting that cue hats a 
BAC equal to or greater than 0.10% For example, the 
65 for the first cue, Turning With Wide Radius, 
means that chances are 65 out of 100 that a driver 
who turns with wide radius at night will have a BAC 
equal to or greater than 0.10%. The 50 for Drifting 
means that chances are 50 out of 100 (50:50) that a 
driver who is drifting at night will have a BAC equal 
to or greater than 0.10%. 
Each value shown is based on seeing only one 
cue However, multiple cues are seen more often than 
single cues. When two or more cues are seen, add 10 to 
the largest value among the cues observed 
When you want to predict from an observed cue 
the probability that a driver has a BAC equal to or 
greater than 0.05%, add 15 to the value shown for that 
cue For multiple cues, add 15 after adding 10 to the 
largest cue value 
Using the probability values to decide whether 
or not to stop a particular driver will be a matter of 
departmental policy and/or officer judgment The 
Guide is only an aid that provides information con-
cerning which visual cues are most likely to indicate 
a drunk driver at night 
2-5 
• J L U U . M A 
65% During a turn, the radius defined 
Turning With by the distance between the 
Wide Radius turning vehicle and the center of 
the turn is greater than, normal. 
60% 
Almost 
Striking Object 
or Vehicle 
The observed vehicle almost 
strikes a stationary object or 
another moving vehicle. 
Examples include: passing 
abnormally close to a sign, wall, 
building, or other object; passing 
abnormally close to another 
moving vehicle; and causing 
another vehicle to maneuver to 
avoid collision. 
60% Weaving occurs when the vehicle 
Weaving alternately moves toward one 
side of the roadway and then the 
other, creating a zig-zag course. 
The pattern of lateral movement 
is relatively regular as one 
steering correction is closely 
followed by another. 
65% 
Straddling 
Center or Lane 
Marker 
The vehicle is moving straight 
ahead with the center or lane 
marker between the left-hand 
and right-hand wheels. 
60% This cue is actually one or more 
Appearing to of a set of indicators related to 
be Drunk the personal behavior or appear-
ance of the driver. Examples of 
specific indicators might include: 
<* Eye fixation 
IP Tightly gripping the steering 
wneel 
• Slouching in the seat 
• Gesturing erratically or 
obscenely 
• Face close to the windshield 
• Drinking in the vehicle 
• Driver's head protruding 
from vehicle 
55% The vehicle is observed being 
Driving on driven on other than the 
Other Than roadway designated for traffic 
Designated movement. Examples include 
Roadway driving: at the edge of the road-
way, on the shoulder, off the 
roadway entirely, and straight 
"through turn-only lanes or areas. 
The last example is illustrated 
below. 
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DOVO A swerve is an abrupt turn away 
Swerving from a generally straight course. 
Swerving might occur directly 
after a period of drifting when 
the driver discovers the 
approach of traffic in an oncom-
ing lane or discovers that the 
vehicle is going off the road; 
swerving might also occur as an 
abrupt turn is executed to return 
the vehicle to the traffic lane. In 
the illustration below, a swerve 
was executed to return to a lane 
after a period of drifting toward 
opposing traffic. 
50% 
Speed 
Slower Than 
10 M.P.H. 
Below Limit 
The observed vehicle is being 
driven at a speed that is more 
than 10 MPH below the speed 
limit. 
50% The vehicle is observed following 
Following another vehicle while not main-
Too Closely taining the legal minimum 
separation. 
50% 
Drifting 
Drifting is a straight-line move-
ment of the vehicle at a slight 
angle to the roadway. As the 
driver approaches a marker or 
boundary (lane marker, center 
line, edge of the roadway), the 
direction of drift might change. 
As shown in the illustration, the 
vehicle drifts across the lane 
marker into another lane, then 
the driver makes a correction 
and the vehicle drifts back 
across the lane marker. Drifting 
might be observed within a 
single lane, across lanes, across 
the center line, onto the 
shoulder, and from lane to lane. 
50% 
Stopping 
Without Cause 
in Traffic Lane 
The critical element in this cue 
is that there is no observable 
justification for the vehicle to 
stop in the traffic lane; the stop 
is not caused by traffic condi-
tions, traffic signals, an 
emergency situation, or related 
circumstances. Intoxicated 
drivers might stop in lane when 
their capability to interpret 
information and make decisions 
becomes severely impaired. As a 
consequence, stopping (without 
cause) in the traffic lane is likely 
to occur at intersections or other 
decision points. 
45% The left-hand set of tires of the 
Tires on observed vehicle is consistently 
Center or on the center line, or either set 
Lane Marker of tires is consistently on the 
lane marker. 
45% The driver of the observed vehicle 
Braking breaks unnecessarily, maintains 
Erratically pressure on the brake pedal 
("riding the brakes''), or brakes in 
an uneven or jerky manner. 
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Driving Into 
Opposing or 
Traffic 
into opposing or crossing traffic 
under one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances: driving in the 
opposing lane; backing into traffic; 
failing to yield the right-of-way; 
driving the wrong way on a one-
way street The last circumstance 
is illustrated below. 
Slow Response 
to Traffic 
Signals 
longer than normal response to a 
change in traffic signaL For 
example, the driver remains 
stopped at the intersection for 
an abnormally long period of 
time after the traffic signal has 
turned green. 
35% 
Stopping 
Inappropriately 
(Other Than 
in Traffic 
Lane) 
The observed vehicle stops at an 
inappropriate location or under 
inappropriate conditions, other 
than in the traffic lane. 
Examples include stopping: in a 
prohibited zone; at a crosswalk; far 
short of an intersection; on a 
walkway; across lanes; for a green 
traffic signal; or for a flashing 
yellow traffic signal. 
40% A number of possibilities exist 
Signaling for the driver's signaling to be 
Inconsistent inconsistent with the associated 
With Driving driving actions. This cue occurs 
Actions when inconsistencies such as the 
following are observed: failing to 
signal a turn or lane change; 
signaling opposite to the turn or 
lane change executed; signaling 
constantly with no accompanying 
driving action; and driving with 
four-way hazard flashers on. 
35% The driver executes any turn 
Turning that is abnormally abrupt or 
Abruptly or illegal. Specific examples include: 
Illegally turning with excessive speed; turn-
ing sharply from the wrong lane; 
making a U illegally; turning from 
outside a designated turn lane. 
30% This cue encompasses any 30% The observed vehicle is being 
Accelerating acceleration or deceleration that Headlights driven with both headlights off 
or Decelerating is significantly more rapid than Off during a period of the day when 
Rapidly that required by the traffic con- the use of headlights is required. 
ditions. Rapid acceleration 
might be accompanied by break-
ing traction; rapid deceleration 
might be accompanied by an 
abrupt stop. Also a vehicle 
might alternately accelerate and 
decelerate rapidly. 
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